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
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
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
STUDENT REPORT

The Background and Development of
Soviet Military Doctrine

Major Raymond J. Swider, Jr. 86-2475

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REPORT NUMBER 86-2475

TITLE The Background and Development of Soviet
Military Doctrine

AUTHOR(S) Major Raymond J. Swider, Jr., USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR Dr. Howard M. Hensel, ACSC/EDCN

SPONSOR Colonel Lloyd T. Moore, AFIS/INC

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
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PREFACE

This study was prepared to satisfy the requirements of the Air Command and Staff College for Staff Problem Solving. As such, it was sponsored by the Air Force Intelligence Service, Directorate of Soviet Affairs. Its potential use is for that Directorate's development of curriculum for its Soviet Military Power series of presentations. I would like to thank the Director of Soviet Affairs, Colonel Lloyd Moore, and his staff for their assistance in researching this study. I would also like to thank Dr. Howard M. Hensel, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Air Command and Staff College, for his valuable assistance. Finally, the time and support of my wife Mary made it possible to do a considerable amount of reading and research of original Russian language material.

Major Raymond J. Swider, Jr.
ACSC, Class of 1986



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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author, Major Raymond J. Swider Jr., was commissioned on 6 June 1973, upon graduation from the United States Air Force Adademy. He went on to graduate from Undergraduate Pilot Training and held aircrew positions in the Strategic Air Command at both Rickenbacker AFB, Ohio, and Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Major Swider also held the position of Headquarters Squadron Commander, 301st Combat Support Group, Rickenbacker AFB.

Major Swider is a graduate of the Air Force's Squadron Officer's School and did graduate work in Soviet area studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California. Subsequently, he served as a Soviet area specialist and Director of Curriculum in the Directorate of Soviet Affairs, Air Force Intelligence Service, Washington, D.C. In these positions he made hundreds of presentations to thousands of Air Force and sister service members, allied officers, Congressional staff, and senior Air Force leaders on Soviet ideology, military doctrine and military organization and Communist Party and Soviet government organization and functions. His duties included liaison with all government intelligence organizations and travel to the Soviet Union.

Major Swider has been awarded the Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters, and Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster.

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REPORT NUMBER 86-2475

AUTHOR(S) Major Raymond J. Swider, Jr.

TITLE The Background and Development of Soviet Military Doctrine

I. Purpose: To investigate the basis for Soviet military doctrine, its development, and utility in the study of Soviet military affairs.

II. Problem: Soviet military doctrine can be mistakenly equated with US service doctrines or weapons doctrines. Moreover, what often passes for strategy in US military analyses is really a statement of fundamental unified doctrine for Soviet decisionmakers. A thorough understanding of the basis of Soviet military doctrine and its development can prevent misunderstanding and give insight into many consistencies in Soviet military affairs.

III. Data: First, and foremost, it is essential to understand the ideological underpinnings for Soviet military doctrine. Ideology plays a dominant role in everything that happens in the Soviet Union and the military is no exception. Soviet military doctrine is state doctrine, set by the political authorities of the state, the Communist Party. The state exists to defend the Soviet experiment in socialism and the military is an organ of the state's defense. As such it requires a fundamental doctrine. That doctrine has two parts: political and technical. The political side of doctrine ascertains probable enemies, the alliance structure of the Soviet Union and its enemies, and the causes of a possible future war. The technical side determines the character of the war, its scope, setting, and choice of weaponry.

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Doctrine is not formed in a vacuum. Rather it is based on a sound analysis of military science which is grounded upon ideology. Soviet military science has multiple disciplines, the two most important of which are military art (strategy, operational art and tactics) and military history. The methodology of military history is vital for correctly determining doctrine's principles and, as such, has two basic criteria: political and technical. These criteria enable the student of military history to track things military as they correlate with a general understanding of history in ideological terms. As such, military history is dependent on the technical sophistication of weapons and the political purposes to which those weapons are put in a given historical epoch. As weapons improve in quality, they impact every other aspect of military art and science. The greatest qualitative impacts are "revolutions in military affairs." The latest of these "revolutions" was the mating of the nuclear warhead and ballistic missile.

Soviet doctrine began after the emergence of the Soviet state in 1922. Its political character has changed little over time, merely reflecting the given enemy of the Soviet Union at the time. One major political change occurred in the 1950s when the Soviets reversed themselves on the inevitability of war with the capitalist West. Technically, doctrine has changed immensely. The doctrine of the '20s, '30s, and WWII called for large armies prepared for immense campaigns of a continental scope. Offensive action was the key to victory. Soviet economic priorities reflected this doctrine. After WWII, the Soviets changed doctrine to accommodate the nuclear weapon. Little discussion went on while Stalin lived, but weapons development went on to propel the Soviet Union into the nuclear age. After Stalin's death, the Soviets reorganized and re-equipped their armed forces to accommodate the new weapons. Doctrine specified that world war would be nuclear war with the capitalistic West, principally the US. In the last twenty years, this fundamental doctrine has been modified somewhat to allow a greater role for conventional weapons and Soviet power projection improvements.

IV. Conclusions: Taking the Soviets at their word, and using their own definitions, reveals some of the interesting prospects for the future. Soviet scholars and military scientists now are discussing the prospect of new technologies emerging which degrade the importance of nuclear weapons and, therefore, considerable Soviet investment. New concepts like President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, and new weapons to support these concepts, portend an incipient revolution in military affairs. Losing out to the US and the capitalist West would be distressing in purely military terms for the Soviets. More important is the ideological fallout. By Soviet

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standards, the days of Soviet backwardness are supposed to be gone. Should a Western technological breakthrough occur, the ideological premises of Soviet doctrine would be graphically discredited. This the Soviets cannot allow and their level of investment and diplomatic initiatives may be aimed at preventing this from happening.

The Soviet Union and Military Doctrine

A coherent, unified military doctrine is at the apex of military affairs in the Soviet Union. There exists great advantage in this situation, particularly when compared to US doctrine which is a family of service and weapon doctrines woven together after the fact. Soviet doctrine, in contrast, is all-encompassing and imparts direction to all Soviet military affairs regardless of service, weapons category, or mission. That is not to say that Soviet military doctrine is correct or superior. It is to say that Soviet doctrine is fairly uniform and consistent over time. This is principally due to the impact which Marxism-Leninism has on its formation.

The State and Military Doctrine

The basis for Soviet military doctrine, as with most things found in the Soviet Union, is the dialectical materialist ideology of Marxism-Leninism. It is not necessary to review that ideology in its entirety to show the roots of military doctrine, because doctrine is a function of the Soviet socialist state. Rather, the ideological underpinnings for the state, and the justification in Marxist-Leninist terms for the way the state is organized and functions, give the best point of departure for understanding the Soviet state's military doctrine. Doctrine, in turn, is an umbrella underneath which Soviet military development proceeds in pursuit of state goals. These goals, of course, either follow Marxist-Leninist principles or are made to look as though they do.

What is, then, the essence of the Soviet state? The Soviets describe their state, and the socialism which it has created, as the correct intermediate historical step between regressive capitalism and true communism. Soviet style socialism requires public ownership of the means of production, the absence of an exploitative capitalist class of businessmen, entrepreneurs, and speculators, and insurance of the people's welfare, because the people are the proletariat, the only class remaining in the epoch of world communism.¹ This socialist society is very much a Leninist concept, although there are many who doubt that Lenin had in mind for the Soviet state exactly what came to pass. Nonetheless, it was Lenin who declared that the proletariat must wrest power from the bourgeoisie and establish a socialist society.² Lenin was not content to let this proletarian revolution come to pass in its own good time. Rather, he, as a professional revolutionary, was determined to make the revolution happen in old Russia and did so when given the opportunity in October 1917. The creation of a Russian socialist state was, therefore, a Leninist idea. Lenin's conception of the state is also Marxist. Accordingly, the state is a manifestation of a given society's ruling class, or part of the superstructure of that society. It exists because of irreconcilable class differences and its organs serve to repress the exploited class.³ The Soviet socialist state is also a manifestation of a ruling class, only in this case it is unique, according to Soviet ideology, because it represents the proletariat, the only class allowed to exist. Lenin was not shy in expressing this idea. He felt perfectly comfortable with the idea of a socialist state with many of the features of a bourgeois one.⁴ The difference lay in the nature and goals of the socialist state:

Again, during the transition from capitalism to Communism, suppression is still necessary; but it is the suppression of the minority of exploiters by the majority of the exploited. A special apparatus, special machinery for suppression, the "State" is still necessary, but this is now a transitional State, no longer a state in the usual sense, for the suppression of the minority of exploiters, by the

majority of the wage slaves of yesterday, is a matter comparatively so easy, simple and natural that it will cost far less bloodshed than the suppression of the risings of slaves, serfs or wage laborers, and will cost mankind far less.⁵

Whether Lenin envisioned a Soviet socialist state in the form of the present one and with its enduring features is arguable. Nonetheless, the present Soviet state continues to explain its nature in the above Leninist terms and grafts Soviet socialism onto the traditional nationalist sentiments of Russia.⁶

This apparent contradiction with the internationalist nature of Marxism-Leninism is explained using the Leninist concept of a transitional socialist epoch, the Leninist theory of imperialism, and the Stalinist legacy of building socialism in one country. The first two concepts are really opposite sides of the same coin. The latter was made compatible with the former by Joseph Stalin.

Despite Stalin's perfection of Soviet socialism and the Soviet state, many of the instruments of state power are a Leninist legacy. Moreover, the instruments of Party dominance which Stalin exploited are also a Leninist legacy. Of course, with Party dominance of the state assured, dominance of the Party guaranteed absolute state control by the Party's key personalities. This condition prevails today. The state and its apparatus, then, are a creation of the Party for developing Soviet-style socialism. The justification for this is found in Marxism-Leninism and its historical determinism. The goal of the ideology is global, Soviet style socialism and the state exists to serve this goal.

The Soviet state's apparatus and organs are similar to any state. Its power rests with these organs. Their repressive nature serves to defend against the counterrevolutionary encroachments of imperialism, according to Soviet ideologues. This, too, is Leninist: "A standing army and police are the chief instruments of State power. But can this be otherwise?"⁷ If Lenin entertained any illusions about the police and army as necessary institutions, they were quickly dispelled by events after October, 1917. The chaos in the countryside and attempt on his life resulted in the formation of the secret police or Cheka under the Bolshevik Felix Dzerzhinsky. The conclusion of WW I, intervention by the Entente powers, and White counterrevolution necessitated the formation of a Red Army. Lenin moved to do so quickly, declaring on 16 January 1918:

In the interest of securing the entirety of power for the toiler masses and elimination of all possibilities of reestablishment of the power of the exploiters, arming of the toilers is hereby decreed, as well as establishment of a socialist Red Army of workers and peasants, and total disarming of the propertied classes.⁸

Of course this was ideologically based on the above description. The necessity for a Red Army to defend the young Soviet state against predatory imperialism was a justification of Lenin's, well documented in numerous statements.⁹

The Soviet Union maintains this Leninist concept of strong state power to protect itself as the self-proclaimed most developed socialist society and insure that historical progress is made globally. In Soviet terms, the army is a humane, peaceloving state organ of defense.¹⁰ Marshal A. A. Grechko, former Minister of Defense, wrote in The Armed Forces of the Soviet State:

The history of the land of the Soviets had fully confirmed that military defense of the revolution, and steadfast strengthening of the defenses of the socialist state and the combat capability of its Armed Forces are objective necessities stemming from the natural laws of social development and the features of class struggle between socialism and capitalism.¹¹

This, of course, is embodied in the program of the Soviet Communist Party, and is, therefore, official state policy.¹² Chapter 31 of the Soviet Constitution makes this policy law, spelling out the primacy of the armed forces to the state.¹³

The class struggle is at the heart of global and national disputes according to Marxism-Leninism. The class struggle is the essence of politics and, therefore, all politics revolve around the consolidation of the state by its bourgeois masters or its overthrow by the exploited proletariat.¹⁴ This led Lenin to paraphrase from Clausewitz describing war as the continuation of politics by more violent means. That the Soviet state represented proletarian interests, meant that it was at odds with all other states, particularly the capitalist states of Europe. Lenin's theory of imperialism further declared that these capitalist states had exported exploitation abroad in colonies and dependencies. The Soviet state was a symbol of anti-imperial revolution, and therefore, anathema to the imperialist world. The post-WW I intervention in the Civil War by the Entente states was evidence of imperialism's intent to undo the progress of October, 1917. Lenin predicted that there would be future efforts by the imperialist states to do in the Soviet state which further justified the growth of Soviet power:

We are living not only in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet republic side by side with imperialist states for a prolonged period is unthinkable. At the end, either one or the other will win. And before this happens a series of the most frightful collisions between the Soviet republic and bourgeois states is inevitable.¹⁵

The class nature of war espoused by Marxism-Leninism and resulting from political struggle is still a Soviet justification for its actions and policies. The exploitative nature of capitalism writ large as imperialism, remains the root cause of war for which the Soviet state is obliged to prepare in self-defense.¹⁶ The Soviets declare that a war of self-defense by a socialist state, or even a bourgeois state defending against the depredations of an imperialist state, is a just war. A war waged for liberation from imperialist domination is also a just war.¹⁷ Therefore, the global struggle and threat of war springs from predatory imperialism and socialism's growth and self-defense. Interestingly, by Soviet standards, when the exploitive

capitalist social system disappears in favor of socialism, antagonistic social classes will disappear in favor of one international proletariat. The root cause of war, class struggle, will have concomitantly disappeared and true peace will ensue.¹⁸

With such a high premium placed on state defense, it should come as no surprise that the Soviet Union has, and does, devote so many resources to the armed forces. M. V. Frunze, Trotsky's successor as Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and Commissar of the Red Army and Navy made this clear in 1924:

...When a new project (economic, cultural, or other) is at hand, it is always appropriate to ask, "How will the results of this project correlate with defense requirements? Would it not be possible, without prejudice to peacetime needs, to make the project serve certain military purposes?"¹⁹

The building of socialism in the Soviet Union kept these questions in mind. Soviet style socialism is declared to be inherently superior to capitalism, not only because it excludes unhealthy competition, monopoly formation, and the accumulation of wealth through exploitation, but also because central planning and distribution enable the state to more quickly marshal resources for priority programs, particularly the armed forces. The Soviets declare this to be an advantage of their socio-economic system.²⁰

The Soviet state, then, has as its principal duty, defense of Soviet socialism and the fostering of a global environment conducive to Soviet socialism. The Communist Party insures that the state carries out its duty. State resources go principally to this task. The process is defined and driven by the military doctrine of the state. Military doctrine is proclaimed as state doctrine and is determined by the political leadership. The Soviets declare that present doctrine is a Leninist legacy, although it has undergone some modification. They also say that doctrine is formed based on the activity of all of Soviet society because it must serve that society. Doctrine is, therefore, a reflection of Soviet socialism in its struggle with capitalism.²¹ Doctrine has two aspects: political and technical. The two are interrelated because, according to Marxism-Leninism, the politics of the state reflect the productive relations of society at large and, therefore, reflect society's productive capacity. Socialism, as the most progressive socio-political system in the world, has a correct and progressive military doctrine to serve the needs of the state.²² As a result, doctrine is based on the calculation of political, economic, scientific, technical, and military factors and military scientific data. Soviet military doctrine must determine the main trend in military development, a common understanding of the nature of a possible war, and the tasks involved in defending the state and preparing state defenses.²³ Military doctrine will, therefore, reveal the political aims of war, the military power of the states concerned, and the correlation of forces among opposing states.²⁴ These are the fundamental Marxist-Leninist laws of war. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, writes that military doctrine should be prepared to answer the following questions:

What is the degree of probability of a future war, and with what adversary will one be dealing?

What character may be assumed by a war which a country and its armed forces would be fighting?

What goals and tasks can be assigned to the armed forces in anticipation of such a war and what armed forces must the country possess in order to achieve the stated goals?

Proceeding from this, how should one accomplish military organizational development and prepare the army and country for war?

Finally, if war breaks out, by what modes and methods should it be fought?²⁵

The Basis for Military Doctrine

How, then, does the Soviet Union answer Marshal Ogarkov's questions and build its doctrine? The Soviets proclaim that Marxism-Leninism represents a specific approach to all of society's concerns. Therefore, in a state of advanced socialism like that in the Soviet Union, everything must conform to the methodology of dialectical materialism, e.g. Marxism-Leninism. Doctrine is a responsibility of the political authorities using all the social and technical sciences and Marxism-Leninism as a basis. Among these sciences is military science, the province of the Soviet military professional.²⁶ It is principally through the study of military science that doctrine is formed and Marshal Ogarkov's questions answered. Military science is, therefore, the focus of Soviet professional military education and can even earn an officer an advanced degree.

Doctrine was first formed in 1925 by Frunze, who declared that it coordinated state aims with the resources at the state's disposal. Frunze went on to say that only by studying military science could doctrine be determined.²⁷ What is military science, then? The Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary defines military science as:

A system of knowledge concerning the nature, essence and content of armed conflict and concerning the manpower, facilities and methods for conducting combat operations by means of armed forces and their comprehensive support. Military science investigates the objective laws governing armed conflict, and elaborates questions pertaining to the theory of military art, which is the basic component of military science, as well as questions pertaining to the organization, training and supply of armed forces, and also deals with military historical experience. Soviet military science is based on Marxist-Leninist teachings and is guided by the method of materialist dialectics and historical materialism, taking into account and using the achievements of those other sciences which tend to promote continual development and progress in the military sphere.²⁸

In short, military science defines the character of war, laws of war, prepares the country and armed forces for war, and defines methods for waging war.²⁹ The laws of war in Soviet military science which govern its study are: 1) the law of mutual transformation of quantitative and qualitative changes (the quantity of men/material can eventually attain a qualitative advantage for the armed forces); 2) the law of unity and the struggle of opposites (basic dialectics -- thesis begets antithesis and the conflict of the two begets a synthesis which constitutes a new thesis, and so forth.) 3) the law of negation of the negation (again an example of dialectics, e.g., for every offense there is a defense and conversely.)³⁰

The Soviets break military science into specific disciplines for study and refinement. Every one of these disciplines is the province of the military professional, although specialization is necessary. Essentially, Soviet military science consists of: 1) general theory (principles) of military science; 2) the theory of military art; 3) the theory of training and education; 4) the military technical sciences; 5) military administration; 6) military geography; 7) the science of military history.³¹

Military art is interesting to the observer because this is the principal component of military science. It is the component where combat operations are studied and is broken down further into three interrelated parts: strategy; operational art; and tactics. The study of military art is the real focus of Soviet military education and training. However, the science of military history is the most essential part of military science for establishing doctrine and establishing an ideological baseline for the correct analysis of all other facets of military science.³² The Soviets define military history as follows:

A branch of historical science and at the same time a branch of military science, because a research topic in military history is a generalization of the military experience of the past, serving as one of the sources of development for modern military science. In studying the objective laws that govern war, Soviet military history uses the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The main scientific discipline of military history includes the history of wars, history of military art, and the history of the Services.³³

Military history, as stated above, is subject to the laws of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, the Soviets categorize historical epochs in military history according to the historical epochs of Marxism-Leninism. They say that war, as a phenomenon of the productive relations of a given epoch (oppressed and oppressor classes in constant struggle, or a war due to the aggressive policies of the oppressor class), is also a function of the general economic conditions which prevail. The interests of the ruling class determine both of the above.³⁴ They go on to say that as history advances from epoch to epoch, productive relations change and productivity grows. Again, the ruling class determines both of the above, and that same ruling class advances military affairs to correspond to the changed circumstances of society in general. Weapons improve, military art is refined, and the organization of society for war continues apace.³⁵

The two operative factors in the march of Soviet military historical science, as with basic doctrine, are politics and technical development. Of course, in Marxist-Leninist terms, these are interdependent because politics are determined by the technical level of production and the productive relations which guarantee that level of production. The politics are those of the ruling class for maintaining the productive relations of society and maintaining class distinctions.

The thrust of Soviet historical science, as with Soviet military history, is in Marxist-Leninist dialectics. The emergence of diametrically opposed

social classes (oppressor and oppressed) leads to higher productivity, but also brings about more acute class struggle. This struggle leads to revolution and a new ruling class. Of course, the productive relations of the new ruling class spawn an oppressed class and the dialectical process continues until the worldwide establishment of socialism occurs and one proletarian class emerges (the threshold for Communism).

So, too, do dialectics affect the march of military history. Armies and the refinement of weapons, military art, and military organization are all manifestations of the level of production of a given epoch and the ruling class which uses military force to spread or maintain the oppressive productive relations which constitute its power. The dialectical process takes part in the process of history described above and military affairs correspond to that historical process. More specifically, the refinement of military affairs corresponds to the level of production and technical sophistication of a given epoch. Weapons reflect this sophistication and the advance in technical prowess leads to qualitative and quantitative improvements in weaponry.³⁶ Of course, the technical sophistication of weaponry is put to use to pursue the political aims of the ruling class. Refinements in military art and organization are another consequence of weapons development. The entire process constitutes the study of Soviet military history.³⁷

The utility of military history for the development of military science and doctrine lies in three areas, according to Marshal Grechko: 1) to understand the trends and processes in the theory and practice of war based on the evolution of methods of combat; 2) to demonstrate to officers the means for victory and the mistakes of defeat; 3) and finally, to enhance the ideological education of personnel.³⁸ Soviet military history does this by tracing past wars, the development of technology, and the development of military art.³⁹ Military history will guide the student to extrapolate trends for the future⁴⁰ which is readily done because of the blueprint of Marxism-Leninism as a forecaster of the direction of human history.⁴¹

The key to the process of Soviet military history lies in the production of armaments. The Soviets quote Friedrich Engels to establish this basis:

Nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the armed forces. Armaments, personnel, organization, tactics, and strategy depend, above all, on the level of production achieved at a given moment and on the means of communication. The moment technological advances become usable and are actually utilized for military purposes, they immediately, almost forcibly, and often against the will of the military command, caused changes and even revolutions in the methods of waging war.⁴²

Another justification of the Soviet view is also taken from Engels:

... the whole organization and method of warfare, and along with these victory or defeat, prove to be dependent on material, that is, economic conditions: on the human material and the armaments material, and therefore on the quality and quantity of the population and on technical development.⁴³

The eras of weaponry which correlate with the general epochs of history in Soviet military history are the era of cold weapons, the introduction of firearms (with smaller eras of firearms development, i.e. smoothbore weapons, rifled firearms, rapid-fire firearms, automatic weapons, and the machine age), and finally the nuclear era.⁴⁴

For the Soviets, as stated earlier, the level of weapons sophistication is a function of the level of production in general. As the use of these weapons is refined in a given epoch, military art, organization, engineering, provisioning, etc. are all improved. So too, there is a corresponding quantitative accumulation of weapons. This quantitative change intensifies the violence and scope of war.⁴⁵ Eventually, there will take place a qualitative jump in the sophistication of armaments. The newer, better weapons will replace the old with the older weapons remaining for some time until they lose all utility. The jump in armaments sophistication is called a "revolution in military affairs" by the Soviets. These revolutions, which have occurred in military history, have two possible causes: the quantitative accumulation of weapons which leads to incremental weapons improvement and a rather lengthy jump in armaments sophistication, or the rapid elimination of old weapons and replacement with newer ones because of greater technical productivity achieved between historical epochs.⁴⁶ The Soviets ascribe the massive accumulation of weapons in a past era as nothing more than an arms race.⁴⁷ Of course new weapons affect armed forces organization, provisioning, engineering, etc., as the process of accumulating the new weapons, and using them most efficiently, continues apace. The Soviets ascribe the greatest impact of a revolution in military affairs in military art:

We have already mentioned that in the past the appearance of new weapons of war exerted influence primarily on tactics and through it on operational art and strategy. As for the further quantitative and qualitative development of new weapons of war and their operational problems, their use has exceeded the limits of tactics and they have begun to be used in fulfillment of operational missions. We observe a completely different picture with the appearance of atomic weapons. These weapons arose as a means of strategic action and only by degrees of improvement began gradually to take root in the field of operational art, and later in tactics.⁴⁸

The process of military history for the Soviet military professional proceeds accordingly. The first era coincided with the slave epoch. Productive relations were primitive and marked by slave-owning and slave classes engaged in agriculture and primitive commerce. Metallurgy emerged as well as the written word and cities. Cold weapons (sword, shield, lance, etc.) were the weapons of the era and dictated the size, organization (legion, phalanx), and extent of military art. Tactics employed were the most important element of military art because forces had to close with each other to do battle due to the nature of weaponry. Military affairs centered on the qualitative improvement of cold weapons, their quantitative accumulation, new organizational structures to optimize weapons use, and tactics.⁴⁹

The feudal epoch which succeeded slave owning societies differed little from it. The two principal classes were the nobility and serfs and the productive relations of these two remained essentially agrarian. This remained an era of cold weapons with continuing concentration on qualitative improvements of those weapons, quantitative accumulation, organizational change, and tactics. Cavalry as an arm of combat received greater emphasis. As the epoch came to a close, production advanced as a new class (bourgeoisie) emerged. The introduction of firearms took place, constituting a revolution in military affairs.⁵⁰ The gunpowder revolution and firearms drove organizational, provisioning and tactical modification. Linear troop formations developed, baggage trains emerged, and infantry skirmish became a new tactic.⁵¹

The capitalist epoch brought about an explosion in productivity and a more rapid qualitative and quantitative change in weapons albeit within the era of firearms. Productive relations were constituted by a ruling entrepreneurial class (the bourgeoisie) and an urban working class (the proletariat). Increased productivity led firearms from smoothbore weapons to rifled weapons to rapid fire and finally automatic weapons. The automotive revolution compressed time and distance and led to increases in naval capabilities and aviation. The scope of the battlefield increased, leading to new tactics and also increased emphasis on operational art, as it was no longer necessary to close with an enemy to deal with him.

The improvement in firearms also affected these two aspects of military art, tactics and operational art. The organization of armed forces changed to accommodate the new weapons with increased dependence on artillery, the emergence of aviation, armor, and subsurface naval weapons. Organization was also affected by the use of conscription and mass national armies which could be raised by bourgeois states with their increased revenue base. The qualitative improvements in weapons were small jumps and not truly revolutions in military affairs. These jumps took place at an accelerated pace as capitalist production became ever more efficient and sophisticated.⁵² In a drive for more human and material resources, capitalist states competed for colonies and imperialism, the last stage of the capitalist epoch, began. Wars of national liberation and revolution also resulted as the reply to imperialism. The first socialist revolution took place in 1917 and socialism emerged.⁵³ Improvements in warfare continued apace reflecting increased productive capacity.⁵⁴

The socialist epoch which began in 1917 had a dramatic impact on politics because of its challenge to world capitalism, according to the Soviets. They also claimed that socialism affected, and is affecting, technical progress because it represents new and more rational productive relations (a classless society) and, therefore, greater productivity. They could make a good case for this argument as the Soviet economy grew dramatically until very recently. In military terms, the Soviet Union was able to keep pace in the quantitative accumulation of arms with its major adversaries, develop its military science, establish doctrine, and then have that doctrine and military science proven in combat during WW II, again according to Soviet authors. It was after WW II and in the present historical epoch, transitioning from capitalism to socialism,

that the latest revolution in military affairs occurred in the view of Soviet military history. This revolution was a major qualitative leap in weaponry, the creation of nuclear weapons carried by missiles and guided by automatic means.⁵⁵ This revolution, the Soviets say, is only truly understood by those with a correct, that is, Marxist-Leninist world view.

The Soviets described the revolution in military affairs as a "radical" one because of the impact the new weapons made on every aspect of military science and, therefore, on doctrine:

The radical changes which have occurred in the postwar years in the armed forces of developed countries have confirmed once again the stability of the Marxist-Leninist thesis on the revolutionary role of military equipment and means of conducting war in the development of all aspects of military affairs.

As a result of the vast qualitative leap in development of the armed forces, military equipment, and means of destruction, there has been a sharp increase in the spatial scope of armed struggle on the ground, at sea, and in the air; the resoluteness, intensity and speed of combat operations have increased; and there has been an increase in the importance of the factor of time, surprise, and the necessity of constantly reducing in every possible way the periods for bringing the troops into combat readiness.⁵⁶

With intercontinental reach possible with the new weapons and an increased level of destruction, the Soviets now declared that strategy was impacted directly because strategic objectives could be achieved through nuclear rocket strikes without the required tactical and operational successes necessary in past wars over prolonged timeframes in order to achieve strategic goals.⁵⁷ An enemy's homeland, population centers, industry, and other strategic targets were vulnerable to the nuclear rocket weapon.⁵⁸

Strategy was not the only part of military science affected. All of Soviet military science's disciplines were subject to reexamination and the changes wrought were truly revolutionary:

Therefore military science in its development, just as in the structuring of the Armed Forces took a certain period of time.

In the period of the quantitative accumulation and qualitative improvement of the nuclear weapon and means of its delivery, elaboration was underway of a broad circle of questions of military theory, connected with research on the influence of the new weapon, on the methods of training and educating troops. Gradually new theoretical views on the nature of future war, methods of organization and conduct of battles and operations were developed. In this period various instructions and regulations with descriptions of the properties of nuclear weapons and instructions in their use were published. In the periodic press scientific and theoretical articles began to appear, including those of a discussion type, connected with

questions of the organization and conduct of combat actions under conditions of use of the nuclear weapon and other problems which arose in connection with its appearance.⁵⁹

The affect on Soviet military science was universal. Military art was transformed, as stated above, because of the strategic potential of the new weapons. As these weapons appeared throughout the armed forces, operational art and tactics also changed to accomodate them. Military construction and organization took into account the effects of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the organization of the Soviet armed forces underwent a fundamental transformation with the creation of a new armed force, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), to manage the new weapons. Military geography, military administration, in fact, all aspects of military thought, were modified because of the nuclear rocket weapon. Marshal Malinovsky, former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, summed up the affect in 1960:

The carrying out of the radical reorganization of the Armed Forces demanded the remaking of the theory of military art, rules, regulations, and retraining personnel, especially officers and generals. Now this stage of rebuilding is basically completed. As a result of this the might of the Soviet Armed Forces has immeasurably grown....⁶⁰

The Soviets even went so far as to restructure the fundamental laws of armed combat, declaring that the correlation of forces between combatants was important, but also subject to radical change because of nuclear strikes.⁶¹

The forces of imperialism also possessed these same weapons. However, for the Soviets this was both a curse and an irrelevancy. Politically, imperialism remained as dangerous as ever, in the eyes of Soviet ideologues. Militarily it was more dangerous than ever. The Soviets proclaimed, however, that capitalist-imperialist doctrine was flawed by definition. Therefore, capitalist-imperialist military science and art were also flawed, giving the Soviets a distinct and predictable advantage.⁶² The trick was to guard against surprise, subterfuge, or the desperation of a nuclear armed imperialist power. The means for doing so was to work on qualitative improvement in weapons, improved training, and the quantitative accumulation of more and better arms, both offensive and defensive. In effect, an arms race was joined:

Thus the correlation of forces of nuclear weapons depends on such important parameters as the initial correlation of forces in such weapons, the distribution of nuclear weapons among the various services of the armed forces, the effectiveness of the antiair (antimissile) defense of the sides, the tactical-technical characteristics of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, protection and mobility of the nuclear means of the sides, the systems for control of the troops and combat means, and the plan of nuclear strikes (distribution of nuclear means over enemy targets).⁶³

Tracing the development of doctrine means tracing the development of military science.

Development of Soviet Military Doctrine

Soviet military doctrine is formed from a study of Soviet military science. The chief doctrine building component of military science is the study of military history which was previously described. The Soviets say that their doctrine is constant, although it does undergo modification.⁶⁴ It follows the policies of the Communist Party whose leaders enunciate doctrine.⁶⁵ The political side of doctrine has remained constant, with only the particular political foe or foes at a given time changing. The technical side of doctrine has changed significantly, particularly after the latest revolution in military affairs. Nonetheless, the Soviets maintain that the essence of their doctrine remains the same.⁶⁶ The Soviets describe military doctrine as follows:

Present day military doctrine is the political policy of the Party and the Soviet government in the military field. This is an expression of state military policy, a directive of political strategy, military strategy representing true union of politics and science in the interests of defense of the country and the whole socialist community against imperialist aggression.⁶⁷

There is considerable consistency in the theoretical basis for Soviet military doctrine. Comparing the above definition to Frunze's 1925 concept of a unified military doctrine reveals the similarities:

A teaching adopted in the army of a given state, which establishes the nature of the construction of the country's armed forces, methods of troops' combat preparation, their direction on the basis of prevailing State views on the nature of military missions lying before the State, and ways of solving them, which ensue from the class essence of the State and the formed level of development of the country's productive forces.⁶⁸

Frunze enunciated Soviet military doctrine in the 1920s as follows:

The consciousness of each worker, each peasant, each Red Army soldier, and primarily each member of the Communist workers' party, which directs the life of the state, must be infused with the thought that as previously, our country is in the situation of a besieged stronghold and will remain there as long as capital reigns in the world; that as previously, the country's energy and will must be directed toward the creation and fortification of our military might; and that state propaganda on the inevitability of an active conflict with our class enemy must prepare that sole psychological environment of national attention, concern, and care for the needs of the army in the atmosphere of which the business of developing our armed forces could go on successfully.⁶⁹

Frunze addressed and answered most of Marshal Ogarkov's questions of doctrine listed earlier. The class enemy is, and was, capitalism of course, and the Soviet Union stood in peril at the hands of the major capitalist nations of Europe who had supported White counterrevolutionaries and intervened as well in the Civil War. Moreover, all the states on the Soviet Union's European periphery were implacable enemies. The Soviets had just concluded a war with one of them, Poland. The Civil War and war with Poland had been large in scope and very fluid, with large use of cavalry and rail transport. Finally, the weapons in use were common to the wars just concluded. Frunze developed this doctrine envisioning that war with the capitalist states of Europe was inevitable. This was a Leninist concept discussed earlier and incorporated into the preamble of the 1924 Soviet constitution. He foresaw the need for mass armies operating on a great spatial scale. Equipment, particularly transport, would increase in importance along with a greater role for rear services. Finally, he predicted that Soviet forces would require activeness and must conduct large-scale offensive maneuver operations.⁷⁰ Frunze first developed the two basic aspects of doctrine, political and technical.⁷¹ He also developed four major questions to be answered in forming doctrine: (1) the nature of a future war; (2) the necessary organizational development of the armed forces; (3) the required nature of training; (4) and the necessity for educating the country through propaganda.⁷² Frunze's basic military doctrine was accepted and approved by the 11th Party Congress.⁷³

The fact that Soviet military doctrine changed little at all through the 30s and through WW II is a function of Joseph Stalin's development of the Soviet armed forces and the security concerns of the Soviet Union. The situation of the '20s grew even more acute in the '30s, although now the principal threat from capitalist Europe came from the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy, rather than Great Britain and France. That merely made the threat more immediate. The Soviet view of a potential war remained Frunze's original one. New coalitions of enemies were emerging and the task at hand, as envisioned by Stalin in his five year plans, was to build an armed force the equal of the most immediate enemies. Stalin's 1931 speech on military preparedness is the best example of the motivation of the Soviet Union in the 1930s:

Sometimes people ask whether it is not possible to slow the pace somewhat, to hold back the movement. No, comrades, that is impossible! It is impossible to reduce the pace. On the contrary, it should be increased as much as within our power.... To reduce the pace means to lag. And the laggards are beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we do not want it! The history of old Russia consisted among other things, of being beaten continuously for her backwardness. The Mongol khans beat her. The Turkish beys beat her. The Swedish feudal lords beat her. The Polish-Lithuanian landlords beat her. The Anglo-French capitalists beat her. The Japanese barons beat her. All beat her because of her backwardness, of cultural backwardness, of governmental backwardness, of industrial backwardness, of agricultural backwardness. They beat her because it was profitable and could be done without punishment.... Do you want

for our Socialist fatherland to be beaten and lose its independence? If you don't want this, you should in the shortest time liquidate its backwardness. We lag behind the advanced countries by 50 to 100 years. We must make up this distance in 10 years. Either we do this or they crush us.⁷⁴

Soviet historians today admit this situation. They state that the five year plans were essential to provide the technical and material needs for the organizational requirements of the Soviet armed forces and make doctrine work. Doctrine demanded that the Soviet armed forces be as well equipped, trained, and organized as all her immediate enemies.⁷⁵ In fact, the Red Army in numbers surpassed the enemies arrayed against it.⁷⁶ Frunze's doctrine had been refined to consider that the Soviet Union would face a coalition of enemies in her next war.⁷⁷ The goals of the Red Army were clearly written out in the 1939 Field Service Regulations:

Any enemy attack against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be met by a crushing blow of the entire might of our Armed Forces.... If the enemy forces us into a war, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will be the most aggressive of all the aggressive armies that ever existed. We will conduct an offensive war, carrying it into enemy territory. The combat operations of the Red Army will be aimed at destruction, at the total annihilation of the enemy.⁷⁸

That these regulations were followed to the letter in WW II is clearly evident. Enemy aggressiveness, however, was obscure in other Soviet actions against Poland in 1939 or the Baltic Republics and Finland in 1940.

The further development of Soviet military doctrine during WW II was never evident. Current Soviet military historians are quick to point out that the Soviet victory in WW II confirmed the correctness of doctrine.⁷⁹ The impact of Stalin and his five permanently operating factors is not acknowledged presently, nor can it be considered a substantive change or contribution to doctrine in light of prewar doctrine or post-Stalin military doctrine. Rather, present Soviet authors praise Soviet military science for its contribution to victory in WW II and for its correctness in forming doctrine, and prescience in terms of what the war would look like.⁸⁰ In fact, Soviet commentators go so far as to declare that WW II was the most important stage in the development of Soviet military science, and therefore, doctrine.⁸¹ It would be difficult to argue to the contrary considering the impact the war had on the Soviet national psyche.

Rather, Soviet military doctrine underwent a transformation after the war, and for obvious reasons. The enemies of Soviet socialism from before and during the war had changed. Germany was defeated and the states of Eastern Europe occupied by the Red Army. In fact, most of these states would become Soviet socialist satellites as a result of the war and Red Army occupation. The other capitalist states of Western Europe were weakened by the war. Italy was a defeated enemy and France and Great Britain faced the breakup of their colonial empires and further erosion of their power. Outside of Europe, the Japanese Empire was defeated and dismembered; China in the throes of civil war;

and other regions on the periphery of the Soviet Union in Asia represented power vacuums as a consequence of the war. From a Soviet point of view, however, capitalism had not been beaten. Rather, it was still powerful and dangerous and represented by the United States. More importantly, the technical side of warfare and doctrine had changed. The US was no longer a remote threat to the Soviet Union. Its armies occupied territory in Europe and Asia and it possessed strategic airpower and atomic weapons which put the Soviet homeland in even greater peril than it had been in WW II. As a consequence, Soviet military doctrine changed after the war. Commentators point to three distinct phases of change: 1945-53; 1953-60; 1960-present.⁸²

The period immediately following the war and leading up to Stalin's death in 1953 is often spoken of as one in which little debate went on in the Soviet military. Stalin's cult of personality affected military affairs as it impacted every other aspect of Soviet society. Though this appears to be true to observers of the Soviet Union, there was obviously considerable effort underway to adjust to postwar changes. The Soviet Union engaged in a massive campaign to develop its own atomic weapons and surprised the world when it tested its first atomic device years before Western experts predicted it would do so. Moreover, Soviet design bureaus began major efforts to build long range bombers, air defense weapons to defend against the strategic forces of the US, and the Soviet rocket program. In the interim, the Red Army occupied half of Europe, tested the resolve of the Western allies in Europe, and put pressure on the US in Korea and China indirectly. The Soviet Union could not change many of the tenets of its military science because it lacked the means to do so. Therefore, doctrine could not change. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union was laying the groundwork for technical change to compete with its political enemies.

The death of Stalin and the progress that Soviet science had made opened up discussion in military circles in the post-Stalin era. The next phase in the postwar transformation of Soviet military science and doctrine took place in 1953-1960 and saw major changes in Soviet armed forces' organization, weaponry, concepts of war, and, in short, all of Soviet military science. As a result, military doctrine was to change. Many things were happening in the Soviet Union contemporaneously. A power struggle for Party leadership took place. The Soviet economy grew at an impressive pace. De-Stalinization began in the political, cultural, and, eventually, military arenas. The result of these events was to give the Soviet leadership increased confidence, and Soviet foreign policy became bolder and global in nature. The first major change in military doctrine was a political one.

The US had become the main enemy of the Soviet Union and the focal point of its foreign relations. US policy and US military potential in the age of nuclear weapons raised the stakes of confrontation. Therefore, the first doctrinal change for the Soviets was to abandon the Leninist concept of the inevitability of war between the two opposing social systems. The Soviets did this at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, the same Party Congress at which Khrushchev delivered his secret denunciation of Stalin and began de-Stalinization. By the 1959 21st Party Congress, the Soviets went further still, and declared that the competition between the two social systems was over. The Soviet Union, and socialism in general, had won by peaceful means

and capitalism was waning.⁸³ Khrushchev, as far back as 1956, had spoken not only of the non-inevitability of war, but also hinted at the development of Soviet nuclear forces to deter future war:

There is, of course, a Marxist-Leninist precept that wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists...But war is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war.⁸⁴

The mighty forces of which Khrushchev spoke were the nuclear weapons the Soviet Union was developing and the reorganization and rethinking underway in the Soviet armed forces. The changes wrought in Soviet military science in all its aspects (organization, military art, etc.) brought about a change in doctrine. In an atmosphere of debate and exchange of ideas, the Soviet Union adapted to the latest historical revolution in military affairs: the nuclear rocket weapon. Khrushchev had signalled the change in 1960 at a session of the Supreme Soviet. Marshal Malinovskiy, Chief of the General Staff, in an address to the 22nd Party Congress made clear the new military doctrine:

The fundamental concrete tasks of the Armed Forces and the direction of military structuring in our country in present-day circumstances were distinctly and expressively laid down by our Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev in his historical speech at the IV session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1960. In the report, a deep analysis of the nature of modern war, which lies at the base of Soviet military doctrine, was given. One of the most important positions of his doctrine is that a world war, if it nevertheless is unleashed by the imperialist aggressors, will inevitably take the form of nuclear rocket war, that is, such a war where the main means of striking will be the nuclear weapon and the basic means of delivering it to the target will be the rocket. In connection with this, war will also begin differently than before and will be conducted in a different way.⁸⁵

The means of combat are spelled out quite clearly in Marshal Malinovskiy's statement as is the scope of this theoretical future war. The enemy is also clearly identified: the imperialist aggressors. The nature of this war was even more clearly defined with the publication of Marshal Sokolovskiy's seminal work, Military Strategy, in 1962. The war would be a clash of social systems, and, therefore, not involve only the Soviet Union and the US, but rather two great coalitions:

In its political and social essence, a new world war will be a decisive armed clash between two opposed world social systems. This war will naturally end in victory for the progressive Communist social-economic system over the reactionary capitalist social-economic system, which is historically doomed to destruction. The guarantee for such an outcome of the war is the real balance between the political, economic, and military forces of the two systems, which has changed in favor of the socialist camp. However, victory in a future

war will not come by itself. It must be thoroughly prepared for and assured.⁸⁶

Sokolovskiy goes on to reiterate that this war will be a nuclear rocket war.⁸⁷ In essence, the Soviets retained optimism at this time that Soviet style socialism was soon to outstrip the main capitalist powers in production. The rationale behind this lay in the economic growth of the Soviet Union in the '50s and '60s and was behind the famous Khrushchev "we will bury you" quotation. The fly in the ointment for the Soviets was not that they would fail to compete by peaceful means, but that socialism could be set back by war. They were realistic enough to know that the Soviet Union had almost disappeared in WW II. The risks of a nuclear war were greater still. From this sober realism came the change in inevitability of war. Likewise, came a desire for security, and hence the necessity for nuclear parity, if not superiority, over the class enemy.⁸⁸ The Soviets sought prudent guarantees of their security and felt that many things could be accomplished due to that security. Of course, security was more than just the accumulation of weapons, although that was vital. It also meant a reorganization of the armed forces (creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces) to properly assimilate the weapons and the improvement of military art (strategy, operational art, tactics) to ensure that they would be properly employed if the Soviet Union went to war. This, then, was the major change to Soviet military science and doctrine in the postwar era for accommodating the revolution in military affairs. Fundamental Soviet military doctrine remains essentially the same, although the last postwar era of its transformation, from 1960 approximately to the present, has seen some modification.

The first hint that the Soviets were hedging on the dominance of the nuclear weapon first surfaced in 1970, after the Soviet Union was well on its way to achieving strategic nuclear parity with the US. The Minister of Defense, Marshal A.A. Grechko, reiterated that nuclear weapons were decisive, but that there remained a place for the so-called "classic" weapons:

According to Soviet military doctrine, a new world war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, will be a decisive clash of two social systems; the coalition of socialist countries, united by common political and military goals will oppose the aggressive imperialist bloc. The main and decisive means of waging the conflict will be the nuclear rocket weapon. In it, "classic" types of armaments will also find use. In certain circumstances, the possibility is admitted of conducting combat actions with conventional weapons. These principles of military doctrine predetermine the principles of military structuring, and preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces at the contemporary stage.⁸⁹

Four years later, the Soviets were so confident of their capabilities, and US military capability had eroded to the point, that Marshal Grechko could extend Soviet military doctrine beyond the territorial perspective of defending socialism in the Soviet Union and the socialist world, to defending socialism globally from imperialist aggression. The implication was that the Soviet Union was powerful enough to choose where and when it wished to intervene

militarily. It could do so by merely defining socialism and imperialist aggression whenever and wherever it wished.

At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted merely to their function in defending our Motherland and the other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state actively and purposefully opposes the export of counter-revolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.⁹⁰

Clearly, Soviet foreign and military policy in the 1970s followed this more confident position of the Soviet Union in the world arena. When the US began in the latter part of the decade, and into the 1980s, to redress what it considered to be an imbalance, the Soviets embarked on a "peace" campaign to politically undercut the US effort, particularly in Europe. Of course, at the heart of the campaign was obfuscation of the meaning of peace to Western ears, as opposed to the Marxist-Leninist definition. Doctrinally, nothing had changed for the Soviet military from Marshal Grechko's statement. Soviet adventures abroad clearly indicated that. Nonetheless, Soviet military doctrine was declared to be defensive, peaceful and benign by the new Defense Minister, Dmitri F. Ustinov:

The Soviet state's peaceful foreign policy, together with its readiness to repulse an aggressor, is the basis of our military doctrine and underlies the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces.⁹¹

A cynical assessment of the development of Soviet military doctrine might say that it is not unique, as the Soviets declare it to be, but rather is very pragmatic and responds merely to the conditions within which the Soviets find themselves. Therefore, it is possible and likely that doctrine can, and will, change substantially if conditions do. There is some truth in this. Obviously the two sides to doctrine, the political and technical, do respond to changes in their respective environments. The Soviets do, nonetheless, insure that doctrine hews to an ideologically pure line. The obvious reason for this is that ideology plays such an important part in all of Soviet society. It gives military doctrine a consistency and there is value in that consistency. Experts say that Soviet military doctrine is a point of departure for all things in the Soviet armed forces. Therefore, it aids in the consistency of weapons development. It also gives the troops a sense of purpose while enabling the military to maneuver in the domestic political arena for resources. Finally, it gives consistency to Soviet arms control dialog with the US.⁹² This consistency is apparent in the basic tenets of Soviet military doctrine which Western experts have drawn from it and from all of Soviet military science.

- Nuclear war is dangerous, but still a continuation of politics.
- War is not inevitable, but the socialist and capitalist camps remain diametrically opposed, necessitating preparation for possible war.

- The USSR would never initiate a nuclear war, but the West would. Such a war would be a just war for the Soviet Union.
- Nuclear war would be a coalition war and the socialist coalition would win.
- There is a possibility that a future world war would begin with conventional weapons, but escalation to nuclear weapons is very likely.
- The offensive is the key to victory.
- Soviet strategic offensive plans call for preemption, reserves for subsequent strike, a total defeat for the enemy, and occupation of critical enemy territory.
- The political objective of war is victory; victory in a nuclear war means that the Soviet state must continue to function despite any damage done; the war must be continued until the enemy is totally defeated; Europe must be occupied; the USSR must recover quickly enough to extend socialism globally.
- There will be no war terminating negotiations at the outset of such a war.
- Nuclear war may be short or protracted.
- Nuclear weapons may be used selectively to alter the correlation of forces.
- The Soviet military, based on the above tenets, must grow to achieve qualitative and quantitative weapons superiority.⁹³

The evidence for the above conclusions comes from Soviet statements about their doctrine and military science. Other evidence is apparent in the development of weapons and forces which correspond to the statements of the Party and the military. In fact, Soviet orthodoxy is such that, even if they remain unpredictable, they are consistent in terms of the trends of their politics and doctrine historically.

The Future?

If there are general trends which remain in force, what direction, then, might Soviet military doctrine be headed? One thing appears certain, the Soviet Union will not permit an adversary to outstrip it in forces or weapons and place it at a disadvantage. Clearly, the Soviets have gone to great lengths to achieve the military status they have and are continuing to strive to keep their position vis-a-vis the US, if not improve upon it. In the political sphere, this means pursuit of the Soviet peace offensive and diplomatic overtures to separate the opposing capitalist coalition. Militarily this amounts to qualitative improvement of all forces and weapons categories and quantitative accumulation of these weapons, or, what amounts to an arms race. The Soviets would not call it an arms race from their perspective, but rather a natural and prudent process within the historical context of Marxism-Leninism. An arms race is something an oppressive, imperialist state like the US engages in to seek an immoral advantage. Therefore, the political side of doctrine has changed little and will not change in the foreseeable future. What does concern the Soviets is the technical aspect of doctrine.

In an arms race, or in Soviet terms the quantitative accumulation of weapons, the Soviets can compete very well. They can control resource allocation and can even control the process of qualitative improvement of the types of weapons which exist today. Arms control, technology transfer, and resource allocations are all devices the Soviets use in pursuit of these aims. What does concern them is a radical departure in weapons technology, or in Soviet terms, a significant qualitative change in weapons. The euphoria of the 1960s over Soviet economic growth, which could translate into the military sphere, has disappeared as the Soviet economy has sputtered. Likewise, capitalism's vitality is undiminished and the possibility of the West, particularly the US, plunging into a major research effort and pulling a technological rabbit out of the hat plays upon Soviet paranoia. They have witnessed this phenomenon before, most recently when the US embarked upon the Apollo lunar landing program of the 1960s. There is some evidence that the Soviets are concerned. Former Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, writing recently (9 May 1984) in the Soviet armed forces newspaper, Red Star, concluded that the present quantity of nuclear weapons has led to changes in their potential use. He now concluded that nuclear war was uncontrollable and unwinnable because of the massive damage possible. He went on to say that now there exists conventional weaponry which has the accuracy to do the damage necessary without the collateral damage of nuclear weapons. He called this a true qualitative leap in weapons development. Finally, he warned that science and technology were leading to new, and as of yet, unknown weapons.⁹⁴ The controversy over these statements and their obvious contradiction with present doctrine, and harsh political and economic realities may have cost Marshal Ogarkov his job. What he appeared to be concerned about was a situation developing like that of the 1940s and 1950s: new weapons

emerging of a qualitatively different nature which leads to a new revolution in military affairs.⁹⁵ There is some doubt that the Soviet Union is in a position to compete if such an event is in the offing. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative most likely is the very thing which fuels Soviet fears. The consequences lie beyond merely losing a qualitative edge to the US and having their quantitative arms growth negated. Those fears are real enough. What is possibly of greater import is the impact of being left behind in another revolution in military affairs because of economic, scientific, and technical inferiority and what this would do to ideology. It would make explaining the situation at home and abroad embarrassing. It would raise questions about Marxism-Leninism which the Soviet Union simply cannot answer.

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
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